This paper generates persistent effects of a monetary disturbance in the context of staggered price-setters. Previous research has been restricted by the CES functional form to price-setting rules that are constant markups over marginal costs. Because price setting is unaffected by competitors prices, these models cannot capture the interaction of staggered price setters envision in Taylor (1980) and Blanchard (1983) . The present paper considers a translog form for preferences and an input-output structure for production, which together generate a pricing rule that responds significantly to competitors' prices. The model is able to generate reasonable persistence, and also confirms the conjecture of Taylor and Blanchard that increasing the number of contracting groups increases the degree of persistence.
Introduction
Explaining the real effects of monetary disturbances is a perennial question, which has been receiving renewed attention. Several recent papers have incorporated nominal rigidities into dynamic general equilibrium models (including Ohanian and Stockman (1994) , Cho and Cooley (1995) , King and Watson (1995) , Woodford (1996) , and Yun (1996) ). These models can generate real effects of monetary shocks, but they do not explain the endogenous persistence of these effects beyond the exogenously imposed rigidity. 1 Earlier work by Taylor (1980) and Blanchard (1983) suggests that endogenous persistence could be generated by staggered contracts, either for wage-setting or price-setting. The intuition given is that under staggering, a price-setter will adjust his contract price sluggishly, because the prices of some competing firms will still be fixed during part of the contract period.
Taylor and Blanchard also speculated, but did not demonstrate, that the degree of persistence would increase with the number of overlapping groups.
The price-setting rules of Taylor and Blanchard are ad hoc, however, and recent research has worked to derive similar behavior for optimizing monopolistically-competitive firms in a general equilibrium model. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996) led the way by demonstrating the difficulty of generating reasonable endogenous persistence in such a framework. They find that prices adjust very quickly, because firms respond to a steep rise in marginal cost as they increase output. Most of the ensuing literature has focused on dampening this rise in costs. To this end, Dotsey, King and Wolman (1997) consider variable capacity utilization, Erceg (1997) moderates marginal costs by assuming wage stickiness, Kiley (1997) considers increasing returns among other features, and Huang and Liu (1998) consider chain production. A limitation of this approach is that it generally assumes the demand has a constant elasticity (CES) form, 4 See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) for a discussion of facts that models of monetary policy transmission should replicate, including endogenous persistence. 1 which implies that prices are set as a constant markup over marginal cost. Consequently, it is cost considerations alone that determine price-setting, thus ruling out the role for competitors' prices emphasized in Taylor and Blanchard. The present paper moves away from the restrictive assumption of a CES demand and considers a translog functional form as an alternative. The result is that the price-setting rule is not a simple markup over marginal cost, but rather is significantly influenced by competitors' prices. This work is similar to Kimball (1995) , which explored the case of a non-CES demand in the context of a partial adjustment model. He found that by lowering the cost to firms of adjusting their prices, a non-CES demand makes price stickiness more plausible and also significantly slows the equilibrium adjustment process.
2 The translog functional form we consider embodies features highlighted by Kimball. We consider this functional form in the context of explicitly staggered contracts, which is better suited than a partial adjustment model for our focus on the issue of endogenous persistence.
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In addition, the model incorporates a production structure suggested in Basu (1995) , in which firms use the final output of other firms as inputs in their own production process. This structure introduces final output prices as an important component of marginal costs faced by firms, and is yet a further reason why the price-setting rule is influenced by prices set by other firms.
Results suggest this framework can generate significant endogenous persistence. For the case of two overlapping contracts and reasonable parameters, between 35% and 50% of the 5 Other related research includes the following. Chari et al. (1996) consider Stone-Geary preferences as an alternative to CES, but do not find significant persistence. Kilely (1997) considers a case in which the overall elasticity of demand varies because the elasticity for procyclical durable goods is greater than that for nondurables. Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) consider a case in which pricing behavior varies because collusive behavior is difficult to maintain during expansions.
initial impact of a monetary shock on output persists one year after the initial shock, the time at which all prices have been reset once. Further, the speculation of Taylor (1980) and Blanchard (1983) is confirmed, that increasing the number of contracting groups somewhat increases the degree of persistence.
The next section presents the basic two-group model, highlighting the use of translog preferences and the implications for the price-setting rule. Section three presents results. Section four extends the model to consider increased numbers of staggered groups.
The Model

Consumer's Problem
The consumer will allocate income intertemporally to maximize utility, defined over the consumption of differentiated products, real money balances, and leisure. Income is derived from supplying labor to firms, collecting profits from firms, and from interest on nominal bonds. The consumer problem is:
subject to the budget constraint:
where u | is labor,`| is the nominal wage rate, | is nominal money balances, | is bond holdings, | is the nominal interest rate, | is firm profit, and | is nominal lump sum transfers.
The subutility defined over differentiated consumption goods is denoted by | , and the unit price index is denoted by | . | | is total nominal expenditure on these consumption goods.
Since the work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , a common choice for the sub-utility function 3 | has been the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form. 4 Despite its tractability, this functional form has serious drawbacks for the analysis of firms' pricing. Since optimal prices are a constant markup over marginal costs, this means that the reaction functions of firms are completely independent of their competitors' prices. In the illustration used in oligopoly models, reaction functions become perfectly horizontal or vertical in price-space, so there is no strategic interaction between the firms.
This special feature of the CES need not carry over to other choices of the sub-utility function. We will consider a sub-utility function defined by the dual expenditure function, which is assumed to have a translog form. That is, the unit expenditure function is defined by:
with & ' & . In order for this function to be homogeneous of degree one, we need to impose the conditions:
We can differentiate the unit-expenditure function to obtain the expenditure shares:
The household demand for each differentiated product then may be written: % may be stated:
Given the elasticity of demand facing the firm for its differentiated product, computed in (7), the first order condition for the firm may be written:
The expenditure share can be substituted from (5), and (13) can be solved for the optimal price, in terms of marginal cost and the prices of competitors. This expression is nonlinear (involving R | and ln R | ), so we will take an approximation to allow us to obtain a simple solution for the price. Taking logs of both sides of (13), using ln
(which is valid for r | small), and substituting for r | from condition (5) we obtain,
Or if we impose symmetry conditions (8):
Thus, an increase in marginal costs of 1% will increase the optimal price by 0.5%. This ''pass through'' coefficient of 0.5 is a feature of the translog demand equations. Empirically, this is not an unreasonable value for the response of price to a change in costs, while holding competitors prices constant. 6 Notice also that a rise in all the prices R &| , 9 ' by 1% will also increase the optimal price R | by 0.5%, so that the pricing equation is homogeneous of degree 9 The literature on exchange rate pass-through is useful here. See for example Hooper and Mann (1989) , which find a pass-through coefficient in the range of 50-60% for U.S. importers of manufactures. Khosla (1991) finds a pass-through of 43% for Japanese data. See Moffet (1988) for a summary of other studies with estimates around 50%.
6 one in marginal costs and all competitor's prices.
Multi-Period Firm Problem
Now we will consider the general case in which firms set a fixed price for A periods. In addition, we will introduce intermediate inputs using an input-output structure advocated by Basu (1995) . In particular, we suppose that the translog aggregate of the differentiated products serves both as the final consumer good, and as an input into the production function of each firm. The production function of the th firm is:
where 5 | is the amount of the composite good used in the firm's production process. The nominal marginal costs of production are denoted by
The cost minimization problem implies:
so that ( w) of costs are devoted to purchases of intermediates. We assume that the demand by firms for each of the intermediate goods, % s | , follows the same translog structure as that for consumers and has the same demand elasticity.
The firm must set a price, R | , at the beginning of the period which is fixed for A periods.
The profit-maximization problem for an individual firm is: . We suppose that the firm ignores the impact of its own price on the aggregate price index | (which is reasonable if the number of products is large). Assuming symmetry (8) and using again the demand elasticity # | ' n r | , the first-order condition for the firm's problem may be written:
To express this in a more convenient form, we use the approximations:
The first approximation holds if r n is close to unity, meaning that the first-order condition (13) for choosing price optimally for each single period is not too far from holding. This is true if the cost and demand conditions are not changing much over the A periods. The second approximation in (20) is valid for r | small. Substituting (20) and (5) into (19), we can express the optimal price as:
Note that if we were to set A ' c we indeed would find the same pricing rule found previously for the single-period problem (15).
To gain some intuition into overlapping price setting, we will now focus on the two-period case. We will suppose that there are two groups of firms who set their prices in an overlapping fashion. Firms ' c c *2 choose their price at the beginning of period |, where | is an odd number, and this price is then fixed for periods | and |n. Let us denote this price by R | , which is assumed to be the same for these firms. Similarly, the firms ' E *2 n c c choose their price R 2| in even periods |, which is then fixed for | and |n. We apply expression (21) for all firms ' c c *2 choosing their price R | , and use R | in place of R | , for ' c c *2, 8 and R 2| in place of R &| for ' E *2 n c c . Then assuming that is large, we can solve for R | as:
Of course, an analogous expression holds for R 2|n , chosen when | n is even:
In both of these expressions, the marginal costs are:
where the approximation holds provided that the prices R | and R 2| do not differ too much from each other.
Notice that in (22), the optimal choice for R | will depend on the predetermined value of R 2| (both directly and through marginal costs) and also on the future value of R 2|n . The latter price depends on both R |n ' R | (chosen in the previous period) and R |n2 . Thus, we can solve for R | by substituting (23) and (24) into (22), to obtain the forward looking expression 8 :
As an example, consider the case where w=1, so that the differentiated products are not used as intermediate inputs.
In that case, (25) reduces to:
; omitting a constant.
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This means that (6/35)0.17 of the weight in the pricing equation is given to R 2| , which is predetermined, and (1/35)0.03 of the weight is given to the future price R |n2 . The remaining (12+14+2)/35=0.80 of the weight is given to wages, which are flexible. These conditions will lead to a substantial flexibility in prices R | , due to the large influence of wages. In contrast, suppose that marginal costs are heavily determined by the price of intermediates, so that we choose w rather small. In that case, the weight on wages becomes correspondingly small (approaching zero as w does), while the weight on the price R 2| becomes large, reaching a maximum value of 2/3. This would indicate a large potential degree of price stickiness, as the firms choosing their prices are heavily influenced by those prices that are predetermined.
Another way to evaluate the pricing equation (25) is to compare it to that obtained when the demand for the differentiated product is obtained from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, which is the case assumed previously in the literature. In that case the pricing rule would be:
Price is set as a constant markup over marginal cost, with no role played by the price set by competitors. Previous papers have displayed a pricing function that looks very similar to our pricing rule (22), which apparently allows competitors' prices to affect price setting. Such a presentation is somewhat misleading, however, because the nominal price in these instances is specified as a function of the real rather than nominal marginal cost. As a result the nominal price must be deflated by the price index, which is an average over the prices set by the two groups. This introduces competitors' prices into the equation. But this role for competitors' prices is indirect and not reflective of the motivation for staggered contracts in Taylor (1980) and Blanchard (1983) .
An equation analogous to (27) holds for R 2|n in the CES case, and the marginal costs in 10 (24) still apply. Combining these three equations, we obtain a forward-looking expression for 
The weight given to the predetermined prices R 2| in this pricing equation is in general smaller than that given to R 2| in (25). An extreme example is provided when differentiated intermediate inputs are not used at all (w ' ), in which case the predetermined prices R 2| receive zero weight, while current and future wages each receive weights of 0.5. This helps explain why previous papers have had limited success in generating endogenous persistence with staggered price setting.
Equilibrium
Money is introduced by the government as a lump-sum transfer:
The process for money is assumed to be:
where 0 | is a mean-zero shock. Clearing of the goods market and bond market require:
The equilibrium in this economy is a collection of sequences { | ,
R | , | , | } satisfying the following conditions: the intertemporal Euler condition (9), money 11 demand (10), and labor supply (11), the production function (16), labor demand (17), definitions of the price index (3), the pricing equation (25) or (28), the definition of transfers (29), the market clearing conditions (31) and (32), and the exogenous process for money supply (30).
The model will be analyzed in log-linearized form. The steady state affects this linearization only through the goods market clearing condition, which depends on the steady-state share of intermediates in total production. This may be computed:
where n is the inverse of the markup in steady state.
We calibrate the model as follows. Basu (1995) suggests a value for w between 0.10 and 0.20. This is based on work by Jorgenson et al. (1987) , estimating the share of intermediates in total output, S C , to be 50% or more. Basu (1995) transforms this ratio into w, the ratio of expenditure on inputs to total costs, using a condition like (33) and an estimate of the markup of 1.6 by Domowitz et al. (1988) . Our model does not have a constant markup, but in steady state this markup will be n . 10 By setting to be 2, the model implies a steady state markup of 1.5. (This implies a demand elasticity of n ' ) Having roughly matched the markup underlying Basu's choice of wc we likewise choose w ' f2 as a conservative benchmark.
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Finally, we set j and q at conventional values of unity and 0.96.
We will use the model to consider the effects of a one-time permanent increase of the < This computation combines the production and cost functions to solve for the intermediates ratio as a function of the ratio of wage to price level. This latter ratio then can be expressed as a function of the markup, using the cost function.
43 This markup of price over marginal cost is computed as .4 @ 4.
. An approximate steady-state markup can also be derived from evaluating the translog price-setting rule in steady state, which implies that the markup of price over marginal costs is h{s+4@, 4=9 for @ 5= 44 Chari, et al. (1996) also consider a production structure of this type. They differ in their calibration of the share of inputs in costs, mainly because they use a smaller estimate of the markup than that used by Basu (1995) . money supply by 1%. The linearized forms of (9) and (10) jointly imply:
where we use lower case letters to represent percent deviations from steady state for upper case counterparts. This is a difference equation in nominal expenditure (R | n | ), with the stable solution:
This implies that a percent change in money supply translates into an equal percent change in nominal expenditure. The effect of the money supply experiment on the level of real output net of intermediates, | , then depends on the degree to which price rises.
In addition, the linearized forms of the production function (16), goods market clearing (31), and labor demand conditions (17) jointly imply:
This may be combined with the labor supply condition (11) and (35) above to write an expression for the real wage:
Conditions (37) and (35) 
Results
The experiment we consider is a permanent shock raising money supply one percent. We 13 consider two price-setting groups and assume no group can reset prices in the initial period of the shock. Regarding each period of the model as half a year, both groups will have reset their prices by one year after the monetary shock.
CES Benchmark Case
Consider first a benchmark case in which preferences are CES and there is no inputoutput structure. Using | as a measure of real final-goods output, Figure 1a shows the impulse response in percent changes from the initial value. The figure shows that output rises 1 percent initially as a result of the monetary expansion. But there is no endogenous persistence. One year after the shock, when both groups of firms have been able to adjust their goods prices, output is below its long-run level. This replicates the findings of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996) . Figure 1b helps explain the result. The rise in output requires a large increase in labor input, in turn causing the wage rate to rise significantly. This rise in marginal costs induces firms to raise their price significantly when given the opportunity. In the first period after the shock, the price-setter raises his price in excess of the 1 percent money supply increase, so the aggregate price rises 0.58 percent. In the second period, once both groups have reset prices, aggregate prices are above their long-run level.
Some intuition into this result can be gained by solving the model analytically (following Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 1996) . Beginning with the linearized CES pricing rule (28), substitute out the wage using condition (37), and substitute out final output with condition (35). Writing the aggregate price index as the average of the two goods prices, and taking expectations as of | , the CES pricing rule may then be written:
where R | is the optimal goods price set in period |, and 6 | is money, both in log deviations.
14 Also note that in the above:
Assuming a random walk process for money, a solution may be written for R | :
where:
The variable, @ (FU , may be interpreted as an index of persistence, as (40) implies the following:
So @ (FU represents the persistence of output deviations after the second period, when all price setters have had a chance to reset their price. 12 This formulation is identical to that of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996) and Kiley (1997) , except that is a function of the parameters particular to our model.
To find persistence, we need @ (FU : f or equivalently . But in the pure CES case with no input-output structure (w ' ), it is true that ' n j, which is always greater than one. Under these assumptions there can never be positive persistence. This case is identical to that analyzed by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996) , and we confirm their finding. A high value of labor substitutability (j low) raises the degree of persistence, but even j = f is not sufficient to generate persistence that is positive.
45 Note that this indicates the fraction of the previous period's output that persiststs, not the fraction of the intial impact two periods previous, which would be a preferable indicator of persistence in the two-period case.
Persistence
The introduction of translog preferences and an input-output structure generates persistence. Setting the input-output parameter in line with the estimates of Basu (1995) (w ' f2), figure 2a shows that output is significantly more persistent. Output rises again 1 percent in the initial period of the monetary shock, and one year afterward, output is still 0.35 percent above normal. Figure 2b suggests that price rises much more gradually in this case. Price setting is now a function of competitors' prices, half of which are fixed in any period. Figure 2b also suggests that nominal wages are rising much less; this is due to the fact that labor is no longer the major input in production.
We can solve the translog system analytically as we did for the CES case. The solution is the same, except that we combine the translog pricing rule (25) rather than (28) with the equilibrium conditions (35) and (37). The index of persistence is:
Again for persistence we need @ e ut} : f, which requires here that 2, a more generous restriction than in the CES case. Even under the assumption of a reasonable labor supply elasticity (j ' ), the model always produces non-negative persistence for any value of w.
Nevertheless, the input-output structure plays an important role in generating persistence.
Consider what happens to the CES benchmark case when we add an input-output structure alone. Condition (41) suggests that the CES persistence index should be a negative function of the level of and hence w. In particular, assuming our case of j ' , @ (FU : f when w fDb. So positive persistence would require that labor costs account for less than 59% of marginal costs. Figure 3 (41) and (43), which implies that:
for all w. Further, the gap between the two cases is not constant. Over most of the range of w, the additional benefit of using translog preferences grows as the role of input-output structure increases. Clearly both elements are important, and they appear to interact in generating persistence. This suggests that earlier research, which tended to consider only one element at a time, may have missed potential persistence generated by the interaction of multiple elements.
Increased Number of Groups
Finally, we wish to check the conjecture of Taylor and Blanchard that increasing the number of staggered groups would increase the degree of persistence.
Begin with the general A -period firm optimization problem (18) and the resulting pricesetting condition (21). Suppose the firms are divided into C equally-sized groups, indexed by } ' C, with each group setting their prices for A ' C periods in staggered fashion. The price-setting equation for any firm in group one would be (replacing equation (22)):
The weight of all other price groups is now EC *E2C , which becomes larger with C, the number of groups. In other words, now a larger share of competitors are not in one's own price-setting group, so a larger fraction of competitor prices are fixed in the current period.
Using the analogous price setting rules for all groups, as well as the definition of costs and price index:
we may write a rather lengthy price-setting equation for any C, which corresponds to equation (25) for the two-group case. 
Conclusion
A CES functional form is severely limiting in the context of monopolistically competitive price setters. It implies that price is set by firms as a constant markup over marginal costs, and is not affected by competitors' prices. This misses the interaction of price-setters envisioned in Taylor (1980) and Blanchard (1983) in their early work on staggered contracts. This paper suggests a translog functional form as a useful alternative. It has also taken seriously the notion of Basu (1995) , assigning a significant role for final goods as inputs in the production process. These two affects contribute to a pricing-setting rule that gives significant weight to competitors' prices. The result is a reasonable amount of persistence beyond the period of exogenously-imposed rigidity. Further, once firms begin to care about the prices set by competitors, it is found that increasing the number of staggered price-setting groups increases the degree of endogenous persistence.
It would be desirable to extend the framework into a full business cycle model, and to use stochastic simulations to more rigorously compare the model's predictions to moments of the data. This is beyond the scope of the present paper, and is left to future work. Further, it is hoped that the framework developed here eventually could augment the micro-foundations of dynamic models used for macroeconomic policy analysis. 
